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Summary Organising health care was one of the tasks of the International Scientiﬁc
and Technical Committee during the 1998–1999 outbreak in Durba/Watsa, in the
north-eastern province (Province Orientale), Democratic Republic of Congo. With the
logistical support of Me ´decins sans Frontie `res (MSF), two isolation units were created:
one at the Durba Reference Health Centre and the other at the Okimo Hospital in
Watsa. Between May 6th, the day the isolation unit was installed and May 19th, 15
patients were admitted to the Durba Health Centre. In only four of them were the
diagnosis of Marburg haemorrhagic fever (MHF) conﬁrmed by laboratory examination.
Protective equipment was distributed to health care workers and family members
caring for patients. Information about MHF, modes of transmission and the use of
barrier nursing techniques was provided to health care workers and sterilisation
procedures were reviewed. In contrast to Ebola outbreaks, there was little panic
among health care workers and the general public in Durba and all health services
remained operational.
Q 2003 The British Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Marburg haemorrhagic fever (MHF) is caused by a
ﬁlovirus, morphologically similar to the Ebola virus.
The initial MHF outbreak took place in 1967 in
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E-mail address: bcoleb@itg.beMarburg (24 cases), Frankfurt (6 cases), Germany
and Belgrade (2 cases), Yugoslavia.
1,2 Between this
initial outbreak and the outbreak in Durba, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (DRC), only seven other
MHF cases have been reported.
3–5 The clinical
picture of MHF consists offever, myalgia, vomiting,
diarrhoea, conjunctival injection and haemorrhagic
diathesis.
1–5 Mortality varied from 23% in Marburg,
Germany to 85% (all suspected MHF cases) and 56%
(conﬁrmed MHF cases) in Durba, DRC. The natural
reservoir of the virus is unknown.
The epicenter of the 1998–1999 MHF outbreak
was situated in Durba, in the north-eastern province
(Province Orientale), DRC.
1 Although the outbreak
began in November 1998, it was the death of the
Me ´decin Chef du Zone on April 23, 1999 that
ultimately provoked the call for international
assistance.
In order to control Marburg or Ebola outbreaks
the organisation of patient care is an extremely
important element. The provision of adequate
supportive therapy may increase survival of
patients, and proper isolation techniques and
education will prevent the transmission of Marburg
virus to healthcare workers and family members. It
is important that the population has conﬁdence in
the healthcare system and that patients are
stimulated to seek healthcare. This may improve
early case detection and follow-up of patient
contacts. Because this was the ﬁrst MHF outbreak
in an African setting, the International Committee
based its recommendations concerning the organ-
isation of patient care on experiences of other
ﬁlovirus outbreaks (the Ebola haemorrhagic fever
(EHF) outbreak in Kikwit, DRC
6–8 and Gabon
9). In
this paper we review the organisation of patient
care during the 1998–1999 Marburg outbreak in
Durba.
Setting
Durba, a village with approximately 16,000 inhabi-
tants, is located in the Watsa health zone, situated
in the north-eastern region of the district of Haut
Uele, Province Orientale, DRC. The political situ-
ation and security in the area are precarious. The
most important economic activity in the region is
centred on the illicit exploitation of gold mines,
owned by the Kilo Moto Mining Company. This
enterprise is especially attractive to young men
who represent about 60% of the population of
Durba. Following the ﬁrst civil war in 1996 and the
deterioration of the socio-economic situation, an
increasing number of men have been working
illegally in these mines. The use of ‘home-made’
dynamite, lack of maintenance in the mines and the
difﬁcult working conditions are associated with a
large number of accidents.
Watsa town, the administrative seat of the
health zone, is located 15 km from Durba. There
are two hospitals in Watsa: the Okimo Hospital, a 70
bed private hospital operated by the Kilo Moto
Mining Company and the 56 bed General Reference
Hospital operated by the health zone. The General
Hospital is in a very poor condition and is poorly
equipped. It was to the latter hospital that the
majority of MHF cases were referred before the
arrival of the international team.
Durba has 16 health clinics. Governmental
employees in the medical facilities in this region
had not been paid for over a year. Their only source
of income was the fees collected from patients for
consultation and medications. Medical equipment
and essential drugs, including anti-tuberculous
drugs, were often lacking. There were no reference
laboratories nor qualiﬁed laboratory personnel.
The only rapid means of communication with the
other regions is by a radio owned by the Kilo Moto
mines. The deplorably rough dirt roads are even
worse during the rainy season when they become
virtually impassable by vehicle. Vaccination cover-
age is as low as 15%, due to lack of vaccines,
absence of a cold chain and lack of reliable
transport. Among the main causes of morbidity in
the region are, malaria, respiratory infections, STDs
(including AIDS), tuberculosis, schistosomiasis,
onchocerciasis. Epidemics of meningitis, bacillary
dysentery and cholera occur often and both plague
and yellow fever are endemic in certain localities
(information provided by Dr Olinda, Me ´decin
Inspecteur du Province).
The coordination team of Medecins sans Fron-
tieres (MSF) Belgium in Kisangani was informed by
the Me ´decin Inspecteur du Province about an
outbreak of haemorrhagic fever with high mortality
at the end of April 1999. It was especially the news
that the Me ´decin Chef de Zone was among the
victims that caused the alarm. MSF Kisangani
informed headquarters in Brussels. At the same
time, the MSF Holland coordination in Goma, DRC,
informed their headquarters in Amsterdam about
the same event. The medical departments of both
headquarters contacted each other and the
decision was taken to send a combined team to
Durba, with the necessary isolation equipment.
Two medical doctors and one logistician arrived in
Durba on May 2, in the company of the Me ´decin
Inspecteur du Province and the provincial repre-
sentative of WHO. At arrival this team met with all
responsible personnel of the different health
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day health structures where suspected cases were
hospitalised were visited, blood samples taken and
an isolation unit installed. Hospital ﬁles in Watsa
were reviewed to collect information about pre-
viously hospitalised haemorrhagic fever patients.
The ﬁrst blood samples were sent to the National
Institute of Virology (NIV) in Johannesburg, South
Africa on May 5th. By May 6th, the identiﬁcation of
the Marburg virus as the causal agent was con-
ﬁrmed. On May 7th, an international team coordi-
nated by Prof. Muyembe, Director of the Institute of
Biomedical Research, DRC, was established in
Durba. MSF was responsible for patient care in the
isolation unit, and organized training of the health
staff about barrier nursing techniques. The main
problems encountered were lack of laboratory
facilities for diagnosis, lack of means of transport
for surveillance activities and the insecurity in the
region.
Between November 2, 1998 and May 28, 1999, a
total of 75 cases of suspected or conﬁrmed (9 cases)
Marburg infections were detected, 62 of whom died
(82%).
10
Provision of health care during the
outbreak
The main priorities were the organisation of an
isolation unit for the treatment of cases, the
development of an appropriate case deﬁnition,
educating health workers regarding modes of
transmission and protective measures to be
adopted, including barrier nursing techniques.
The isolation unit in Durba
An isolation unit was organised at the Durba
Reference Health Centre. This centre is a public
facility and was therefore easily accessible and
modiﬁable. The principal reason for choosing this
centre was that it was the most suitable of the
structures available, it was located near a water
point, and it was situated in the centre of Durba.
The centre consisted of a traditional mud-brick
construction with a straw roof (Fig. 1). It was poorly
equipped, lacking both running water and electri-
city. Within a few days, a supply of chlorinated
water and a waste disposal system were in place.
The isolation unit was organised into three areas: a
clean area for the staff (nursing station) with a
small pharmacy and stock, and area for probable
MHF cases, with a capacity of six beds, and an
isolation area for clinical MHF cases with a capacity
of three beds (Fig. 2). Patients with MHF symptoms
and signs came to the isolation unit spontaneously
or were referred by the MHF surveillance team. For
case deﬁnitions of probable and clinical MHF cases
see Table 1. Each room had separate medical
equipment (thermometers, stethoscope, otoscope,
lamps and blood pressure instrument). Initially,
petrol lamps were used as light source but these
were later replaced by solar lamps. Showers and
latrines were installed for each area.
A team of two nurses made patient rounds: one
nurse examined the patients while a second nurse
handled patient ﬁles to avoid contamination of
ﬁles, which were kept in the nursing station.
Additional nurses were recruited from other health
centres in order to provide 24 h care, organised into
three 8 h shifts of two nurses for each shift. Doctors
from the international team made rounds and
examined patients twice daily with the nursing
staff. The nurses generally made patient rounds
three times in 24 h, or more frequently if necessary.
A checklist with clinical symptoms and signs was
completed three times daily for each patient with
the aim of further reﬁning the MHF case deﬁnition.
Blood samples were obtained from suspect and
clinical cases, serum was separated and stored in
liquid nitrogen and sent to NIV and the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) for analysis by ELISA (anti-
gen, IgG and IgM), PCR and viral isolation.
Protective equipment was distributed to health
care workers consisting of two sets of gloves, a
cotton scrub suit, a cotton gown, a rubber apron, a
Table 1 Case deﬁnitions of Marburg haemorrhagic fever
(MHF) used for epidemiologic surveillance during the MHF
outbreak in the Durba/Watsa area
Probable case
† A person at risk for MHF (gold miner) or a person who has
been in contact with a clinical case during the past 3 weeks,
with acute fever (,2 weeks) not responding to antimalarial
and antibiotic treatment
Or
† A person who has been in contact with a clinical case
presenting at least three of the following general symptoms
Headache General pain
Nausea, vomiting Dysphagia
Anorexia Dyspnoea
Non-bloody diarrhoea Cough
Asthenia Thoracic pain
Abdominal pain
Or
† Unexplained sudden death during a MHF epidemic
Clinical case
A person presenting or with a recent history of acute fever
(,2 weeks) and 1 or moreof the following haemorrhagic signs
(gingival bleeding, bloody diarrhoea or melena,
haematemesis) or a conjunctival injection (red eyes)
Health care during Marburg outbreak 349surgical mask, protective goggles, a surgical cap
and rubber boots. Reusable protective gowns were
preferred because they ﬁtted better than disposa-
ble ones. Gloves and a mask were provided to the
family member caring for the patient. Two cleaners
were engaged to disinfect latrines and showers, to
clean the rooms, and spray boots, gloves and aprons
of health care workers with a solution of 0.2%
chlorine when they left the isolation area. Clothes
were washed in a disinfecting solution of chlorine
after use. Guards were engaged to watch the
entrance to the isolation unit and all staff working
in the isolation unit, were paid. Staff members were
not quarantined.
Figure 1 Isolation unit of the Durba Reference Health Centre.
Figure 2 Isolation unit of the Durba Reference Health Centre.
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installed, and May 19th, 15 patients were admitted
to the centre. In only four of them, was the
diagnosis of MHF conﬁrmed by a laboratory test.
The characteristics and clinical outcome of these
patients will be described elsewhere. The clinical
diagnosis (no laboratory tests available) of other
patients included AIDS (2), tuberculosis (3), malaria
(4), hepatitis (1), and amoebiasis (1). Treatment of
the MHF cases was essentially symptomatic. Para-
cetamol was given to reduce fever or pain, since
aspirin carries an increased risk of bleeding.
Perfusions were given to patients with dehydration.
Anti-emetics were given for vomiting. Because of
the lack of diagnostic capacity and the need to
restrict examinations of blood and body ﬂuids in the
setting of a MHF outbreak, anti-malarial treatment
was given based on clinical symptoms only. Anti-
biotics were given for suspected bacterial
infections.
The isolation unit in Watsa
In the Okimo Hospital in Watsa, another isolation
unit was established after two clinically suspected
cases of MHF were identiﬁed by members of the
international team in the city of Watsa. One of the
suspected MHF cases was initially hospitalised at
the Watsa General Hospital, but as this hospital was
very poorly equipped, the plan was to transfer the
patient to Okimo Hospital. However, upon further
observation, it became apparent that the patient
was suffering from a chronic illness and he was
therefore not transferred. A blood sample later
showed he was not infected. The second patient, a
22-year-old woman who had been in contact with
her mother who had died with MHF symptoms had
developed similar symptoms. Many members of the
international team were not convinced that she had
MHF because she was not severely ill. She was
therefore treated at home. Because of vomiting and
diarrhoea she received a perfusion from a private
nurse. Her general condition improved and she was
never transferred to the hospital. Serologic testing
proved later that she had been infected with the
Marburg virus.
Other health centres in Durba and Watsa
Most of the health centres in Durba and Watsa were
visited by a member of the coordination team.
Information about the clinical presentation, case
deﬁnition, epidemiology and nursing barrier tech-
niques as well as disinfection procedures and waste
disposal were provided to healthcare workers
during a training module on MHF. Each health
centre was provided with a basic protective kit (see
Table 2). Suspected cases arriving at health
facilities were isolated and transferred to the
isolation centre in Durba by ambulance. For
suspected MHF in distant villages, patients
remained at home and the local nurse provided
instructions to the family on simple protective
measures such as using gloves, washing hands with
soap, abstaining from sex or from sleeping in the
same bed with the patient. All suspected cases
were reported to the coordination team, and nurses
were asked to follow contacts of suspect cases for
possible symptoms during the 3 weeks after the last
date of contact with the case.
Discussion
Although the trigger to call for international
assistance was similar in Kikwit and Durba, namely
the fact the medical staff were among the victims,
the situation in Durba was less dramatic than in
Kikwit. The Kikwit epidemic was mainly caused by a
large nosocomial outbreak at the Kikwit General
Hospital.
6 The deaths of many healthcare workers
caused panic among other healthcare workers and
the general population. All health structures were
closed and suspect EHF cases were initially aban-
doned, which was possibly one of the reasons for
the high case fatality rate in Kikwit (80%).
In Durba/Watsa, all health structures continued
to function during the epidemic. This can be
explained by the fact that the disease was already
familiar to the health care workers as the ‘Durba
syndrome’ and that many of them had been in
contact with MHF cases either in this or in previous
epidemics without falling ill. In contrast with the
Table 2 List of equipment distributed to each health centre
Chlore 70% 500 g
Disinfecting soap 2 pieces
Soap 1 piece
Jerrycan 20 L 1
Thermometer 1
Plastic sheet 1.5 £ 2m 1
Plastic basin 1
Bucket 1
Apron (paper) 10
Apron (plastic) 1
Examination gloves 50
Protection masks 4
Protection glasses 1
Household gloves (pair) 1
Syringes 5 ml 20
Needles 21 G 20
Tourniquet 1
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died; a nurseanda physicianfrom theWatsa General
Hospital in 1994 and the afore-mentioned physician
from the same hospital in 1999. For a short time
patients refused to come to either of the two
hospitals in Watsa even though most of the staff
continued to work at their posts. In fact, the
population held some of the staff members respon-
sible for the death of the physician from Watsa
General Hospital and two of them had been impri-
soned, accused of poisoning the doctor. After the
arrival of the international team, who explained the
causeoftheepidemictothepopulationandthelocal
authorities and who intervened to free the arrested
health staff, the activities in the hospitals slowly
resumed. The health centres in Durba and Watsa
never stopped functioning.
Apart from a few isolated MHF cases
4,5 reported
from the African continent in the past 30 years, the
only documented MHF epidemic occurred among
laboratory workers in Europe and totalled 32
patients. These patients were treated under strict
isolation procedures, receiving supportive care
with antibiotics, perfusions, and transfusions with
blood/platelets. They were closely followed with
appropriate laboratory investigations. The case
fatality rate in Europe was 22%
11 compared with a
case fatality rate in Durba/Watsa of 56% among
conﬁrmed MHF cases. This difference in case
fatality rate can be explained by the lack of
adequate healthcare that was offered to patients
in Durba. An additional factor explaining this
difference is that the majority of the MHF cases in
Durba were diagnosed retrospectively and that
cases with milder disease were therefore not
reported. Although barrier-nursing techniques
were not used before the arrival of the inter-
national team, the secondary transmission rate was
low. This is in contrast with the high secondary
transmission rates observed during EHF outbreaks.
The reason for this difference is not clear. One
explanation is that in Durba there is no large
hospital facility and therefore no risk for a large
nosocomial outbreak. It could also be that MHF is
less infectious than EHF. During previous EHF
outbreaks a lot of EHF transmission occurred during
burial practices. In Durba, a family member became
infected during burial rituals only occasionally.
Although burial practices in Durba and Kikwit
seem to be quite similar, anthropological studies
in this ﬁeld are certainly needed.
During the Kikwit outbreak, it was relatively easy
to recognise EHF cases clinically because, in most
cases, a history of contact with another EHF case
could be established and haemorrhagic manifes-
tations were highly predictive for EHF.
6,12,13 In
Durba, the situation was different. For the majority
of patients, the mode of infection with the Marburg
virus was unclear. Often there was no history of
contact with another MHF case. Infections occurred
primarily in mine workers, but because a large
percentage of men living in Durba are mine
workers, it was unclear whether being a mine
worker was a risk factor which should have been
included in the case deﬁnition.
It quickly became clear that the use of the simple
case deﬁnition of MHF, a version adapted from the
case deﬁnition of EHF, was not speciﬁc enough to
identify suspected cases. Initially, patients with
haemoptysis were accepted, as suspected MHF
cases but it subsequently appeared that these
patients were suffering from pathologies of the
respiratory tract, very probably tuberculosis. Some
patients referred by the surveillance teams, which
met the case deﬁnition proposed by the inter-
national committee in fact had other diseases. They
often were chronically ill but presented with
sudden haemorrhagic manifestations: e.g. one
patient was icteric and presented with haematem-
esis, probably related to oesophageal varices due to
portal hypertension. Another patient presented
with haemoptysis, chronic diarrhoea, oral candi-
diasis and a herpes zoster infection. This patient
probably had AIDS associated with pulmonary
tuberculosis. The diagnosis of mild cases was also
difﬁcult since the initial symptoms are often non-
speciﬁc and compatible with other febrile illnesses.
One of the nurses working during the night shift
in the Durba isolation unit sustained a needle-stick
injury from an infusion that had been placed in the
vein of patient who later died of MHF. An infusion
had been placed in this patient because he was
severely ill and was vomiting blood.During the night
he became confused and very agitated. He pulled
out the infusion while it was still running. Two
nurses tried to control the patient but one of the
nurses stuck her colleague with the infusion needle.
The nurse never became ill and he never developed
antibodies to Marburg virus infection. Lack of
adequate training of the night shift nursing staff,
and insufﬁcient lighting in the patient rooms were
thought to have contributed to the circumstances
surrounding this accident. The reason why the nurse
never became infected is probably because the
blood inside the needle was washed out because the
infusion was still running when it was removed by
the patient.
It was very difﬁcult to ensure that family member
care-givers wore protective equipment all the time
and to limit the number of visitors per patient.
Fortunately, no secondary infections occurred
R. Colebunders et al. 352either among the health personnel or family
members of patients.
During the EHF outbreak in Kikwit, one of the
major interventions to control the outbreak was the
buryingofallpersonswhodiedduringtheepidemicby
trained Red Cross volunteers, wearing protective
equipment. During the health education campaign in
Kikwit, a great deal of attention was given to
cautioning the population not to touch a dead body
withoutusinggloves.In Durba,no attempt was made
to systematically bury all deceased, also those not
suspected of haemorrhagic fever, by a specialised
team as was done during the Kikwit EHF outbreak.
The bodies of patients who died at the reference
health centre in Durba were disinfected with a 2%
solutionofcalciumhypochloritebythehealthcentre
staffandplacedinabodybag,whichwasthenhanded
over to the family for burial. Family members were
instructed not to open the body bag and to touch the
bag only if wearing gloves (supplied by the health
centre). The homes of the deceased were also
disinfected with calcium hypochlorite. Although, no
secondary cases of MHF occurred in these families, it
is important to supervise burials of suspect cases,
because it is difﬁcult to rely on compliance of
mourning relatives.
From June 1999 to December 2000, 30 laboratory
conﬁrmed new cases of MHF plus 45 suspected MHF
cases were reported from the Durba/Watsa area.
MHF seems to be endemic in this region and as long
as the reservoir of the infection remains unknown,
MHF will remain a threat for the population in
general and healthcare workers in particular. It is
important to continue epidemiological surveillance
and to provide regular supervision of healthcare
workers. Refresher courses on nursing barrier
techniques, waste disposal and sterilisation of
needles should be given and protective equipment
should remain available in the area.
Health facilities in the region should be
reinforced. This region needs at least one district
laboratory with qualiﬁed personnel to perform
‘essential microbiological tests’ such as Ziehl–
Neelsen staining of sputum smears, thick smears,
parasitological stool examination, blood and stool
cultures. The armed conﬂict in the region should
not be a reason to abandon it and stop providing
essential drugs, including anti-tuberculosis drugs
and vaccines. Otherwise, new epidemics, not only
of Marburg infection, are to be expected.
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